Burglary
Reducing Burglary Initiative: Design, development and delivery
This report is assesses the impact and cost-effectiveness of the Reducing Burglary Initiatives (RBI) programme design, and provides policy makers, policy advisers and researchers, with lessons for guiding future crime reduction programme design and development.
Title: Reducing Burglary Initiative: Design, development and delivery
Author: Niall Hamilton-Smith (RDS).
Series: Home Office Research Study 287
Date published: January 2005
Number of pages: 116
Availability: Download
full report 
PDF 398Kb
The Initiative was divided into 3 phases. In phases 1 and 2, crime and disorder partnerships were invited to submit applications for funding to run projects aimed at reducing local burglary problems in areas or communities that suffered twice the national average burglary rate over the previous 3 years. In Phase 3 applicants only needed to have one-and-a-half times the national average, and weren't limited to a 12 month duration.
Key findings
Projects experienced mixed fortunes in terms of implementing their planned activities, and some clearly under-achieved in terms of impact.
Phase I projects had a positive impact overall, with estimated net reductions in domestic burglary of over 20% observed in some areas. (Kodz and Pease, 2003).
Many aspects of the programme's design were strong and adapted well to changing circumstances. For instance, a responsive policy team in the central Home Office ensured that refinements were made to the RBI as it progressed.
Other aspects of the RBI were less successful. Some of these problems related to the overall design and development of the Crime Reduction Programme, which the middle managers were unable to control.
Sponsoring innovation
Phases II and III of the RBI showed examples of innovative practice. However, the programme failed to extend the existing crime reduction evidence base as much as originally hoped because Phase I had insufficient resource and time to support innovation. More specifically:
the capacity of Strategic Development Project participants was over-estimated
the process for selecting projects was a poor vehicle for identifying suitable sites for hosting innovation
timescales for bid submissions were short and resulted in bidders being more inclined to suggest 'off the shelf' solutions or ideas that extended existing initiatives.
Extending the evidence base
A 'hands off' model for evaluating innovative project work did not really work. Future evaluators need to work with projects to get new practices up and running before making an assessment of whether they work.
The evaluation design failed to take account of the wider programme. Evaluation and programme designs need to be developed together to ensure that the objectives, and processes for achieving those objectives, are compatible and consistent.
Projects were ill prepared for the high level of evaluation demands. This caused tension between evaluation and project personnel. The Home Office needs to communicate evaluation requirements better at the earliest opportunity.
The Reducing Burglary Initiative benefited over time from a productive relationship between Home Office policy and research staff, which led to improvements to the design and administration of the initiative under Phases II and III.
Reducing burglary through increasing burglary reduction activity
The RBI was hugely successful in achieving this. It effectively distributed funds to 247 projects, which between them encompassed over 2 million households. However, there were difficulties associated with the competitive bidding process.
The time provided for projects to develop and submit bids was insufficient.
Projects were unrealistically expected to be ready to deliver a programme of work immediately after a bid had been approved.
In order to secure funds, some applicants under-costed and over-promised.
Competitive bidding may have been an inappropriate model for targeting funding at high crime areas. A more proactive identification of areas in need, maybe preferable.
Development seminars held mid-way through the Phase II and III project bidding processes, and processes for providing feedback on bids, helped applicants improve the quality of their final bids.
Under Phase I consultancy support was limited. Phase II projects benefited from the availability of consultancy support throughout the bidding process and through improvements in the support provided by crime reduction teams in Regional Government Offices.
Problems were experienced in the specification, co-ordination, and communication of consultant and Regional Government Office roles. Regional Offices and individual consultants also varied in performance. Progressive enhancements to Regional Office capacities, with the appointment of Regional Directors mid-way through the RBI, and the creation of regional research teams, will hopefully reduce this variability.
Many RBI projects had difficulties in retaining staff. Weak hand-over arrangements meant staff turnover was disruptive (e.g. project delays or abandonment).
The successful development and implementation of project was reliant on the project's ability to adapt intelligently to changing circumstances. This requires appropriate project monitoring systems.
Accurately estimating the likely demand for project services was a critical part of ensuring success. Many projects struggled to do this well. Work is more likely to be successful if projects proceed, not only on the basis of what communities need, but also on the basis of what communities want.
Reducing burglary cost-effectively
A number of programme-level and process issues were likely to have had a bearing on cost-effectiveness.
Effectiveness of the programme in delivering an appropriate level of resources to projects. Projects were more likely to be effective if the centre allocated them a suitably sized grant, proportionate to the scale of their problem and existing capacity of their organisation.
The financial management, procurement, and contract development skills amongst the pool of RBI practitioners. There was a widespread lack of this.
The central Home Office design potentially undermined the cost-effectiveness of some projects when it came to the procurement of services (e.g. short project timetables limited the opportunity to 'shop around').
Policy implications
Detailed recommendations are provided in the final chapter of the report.
Last update: 14 February 2005